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FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF PUNISHMENT 
Richard A. Bierschbach 
ABSTRACT—Scholars have long studied the relationship of structural 
constitutional principles like checks and balances to democracy. But the 
relationship of such principles to democracy in criminal punishment has 
received less attention. This Essay examines that relationship and finds it 
fraught with both promise and peril for the project of democratic criminal 
justice. On the one hand, by blending a range of inputs into punishment 
determinations, the constitutional fragmentation of the punishment power 
can enhance different types of influence in an area in which perspective is 
of special concern. At the same time, the potentially positive aspects of 
fragmentation can backfire, encouraging tunnel vision, replicating power 
differentials, and making it easier for more well-resourced voices to drown 
out others. Thus, the same structure that generates valuable democratic 
benefits for punishment also falls prey and contributes to serious 
democratic deficits. But despite its drawbacks, we cannot and should not 
abandon the Constitution’s fragmented approach to crime and punishment. 
The more promising move is to look for ways to make different loci of 
influence and representation more meaningful within our existing 
framework, doing more to ensure that multiple voices are heard. 
AUTHOR—Dean and Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law 
School. Thanks to the Northwestern University Law Review for hosting this 
Symposium and to the Symposium and Conference participants for their 
helpful comments on an early sketch of this Essay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the relationship of structural constitutional principles like 
checks and balances to democracy in criminal punishment? The usual 
answer is straightforward: in punishment, as elsewhere, checks and 
balances further democracy by avoiding tyranny and abuse. Beyond that, it 
is not much discussed. Most treatments of the relationship of constitutional 
law to democracy in punishment focus instead on a particular constitutional 
provision or institution, and they often lurch between two poles. At one, 
constitutional law ensures a popular voice in punishment. The eighteenth-
century jury embodies this vision with its public trials in the town square. 
At the other, constitutional law gives a voice to the “discrete and insular 
minorities” who are so often punishment’s targets.1 The Warren Court 
embodies this vision with its representation-reinforcing approach to judicial 
review. 
Such neglect of structure is a mistake. Checks and balances and 
similar issues of what I call fragmentation—meaning the way in which the 
Constitution divides power between actors and governments—have a richer 
and more complicated relationship to democracy in punishment than this 
picture suggests in good and bad ways. While scholars of government often 
see fragmentation as a bug, when it comes to punishment, it also acts as a 
feature. Punishment is notorious for the messy mix of competing values, 
purposes, and trade-offs it implicates, to say nothing of its demand for 
attention to the details of each case. By affirmatively blending a range of 
inputs into punishment determinations, fragmentation can enhance different 
1 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87–104 (1980). 
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types of influence in an area in which perspective is of special concern. At 
the same time, however, the potentially positive aspects of fragmentation 
can backfire, encouraging tunnel vision, replicating existing power 
differentials, and making it easier for more well-resourced voices to drown 
out others. In either case, the way in which the Constitution fragments the 
power to punish is a vital subject of attention for anyone interested in the 
intersection of democracy, criminal justice, and constitutional law.2 
This Essay fleshes out these points in five short Parts. Part I discusses 
fragmentation in sentencing as a case study from positive law, and Part II 
shows how fragmentation creates diverse points of influence and 
perspective in punishment. Part III translates those points to criminal 
justice writ large. Part IV unpacks some of the downsides of fragmentation, 
and Part V offers some suggestions for reforms that might do more to 
capture its benefits. 
I. SENTENCING
Let me begin with sentencing. Fragmentation occupies a crucial place 
in the modern constitutional law of sentencing, although scholarship has 
been slow to appreciate that. Like much criminal procedure scholarship, 
sentencing scholarship can be “clausebound.”3 It treats the individual 
constitutional rights that govern sentencing as discrete and isolated 
provisions and minimizes the ways in which rights and structural 
considerations interact. 
Those interactions have become more important as sentencing has 
become more imbalanced. The dominance of plea bargaining, the 
disappearance of jury trials, the decline of parole and executive clemency, 
the growth of mandatory minima, the rise of sentencing guidelines that tie 
judges’ hands—these and other developments have shifted more power to 
prosecutors and have squeezed diverse views out of the system. As these 
structural imbalances have worsened, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
sentencing law has pushed back against them. To the extent the Court has 
intervened in sentencing over the last four decades, it frequently has done 
so in ways that have resisted (albeit not prevented) the march toward 
concentrated sentencing power. Take three illustrations from three distinct 
areas, each of which involves fragmentation in its own way. 
2 Here a caveat bears emphasis. As the different dimensions of democracy inherent in the jury and 
Warren Court visions suggest, “democracy” and “democratic values” are deep and contested concepts. 
My points in this Essay do not turn on any specific definition of them; I simply use them and similar 
terms to capture values like representativeness and equal citizenship that are central to virtually all 
contemporary liberal democratic theories. 
3 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 125 (1998). 
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A. The Law of Apprendi
Apprendi v. New Jersey resurrected juries as a check on the sentencing 
power of legislators, prosecutors, and judges under the Sixth Amendment.4 
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining, Apprendi was something of a 
hollow victory for the jury, and in some ways it might even have 
strengthened prosecutors’ hands. But later decisions gave its underlying 
structural concerns real bite. They further spread out power among 
sentencers by invalidating binding guidelines, freeing sentencing judges to 
consider a wide range of factors and policy concerns through reasoned 
variances at sentencing, and fine-tuning appellate review to prompt more 
give-and-take among sentencing judges, appellate courts, and sentencing 
commissions.5 Critics complain that those decisions have little to do with 
the Sixth Amendment’s aim of reinjecting the jury into punishment. That is 
true and misses the point: on this reading, the Apprendi line is less about 
furthering the individual jury right than it is about catalyzing the systemic 
diffusion of concentrated power. The Sixth Amendment is the tool, not the 
goal. 
B. Juvenile Sentencing
Miller v. Alabama6 and Graham v. Florida7 struck down mandatory 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses 
and discretionary life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of 
nonhomicide offenses, respectively. Most commentators follow the Court’s 
lead in analyzing these decisions mainly as matters of substantive 
proportionality. But they also embody fundamental points about the 
institutional and procedural structure of juvenile sentencing. Both 
decisions, after all, left fully intact the power to imprison juveniles for their 
natural lives. Their more significant effect was to shift the decisional power 
to do so, from legislatures to trial judges and prosecutors in Miller and 
from trial judges and prosecutors to parole boards in Graham. Despite its 
doctrinal use of proportionality, those systemic consequences were not lost 
4 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact other than the fact 
of a prior conviction that increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum to be presented to a jury 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
5 See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 500–05 (2011); Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2007); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004). 
6 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
7 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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on the Court. Both opinions weave into their analyses passages recognizing 
that the structure of juvenile justice is unbalanced.8 
C. Capital Punishment
Constitutional capital sentencing law substantially breaks apart the 
power to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court takes the death 
penalty off the table for certain crimes and offenders. Legislatures then 
make broad, ex ante judgments that lay out criteria for death-eligible 
crimes. Prosecutors make first-cut, ex post judgments about whether to file 
capital charges. Juries assess that judgment twice, at both the guilt and 
sentencing stages. Judges independently review potential death sentences at 
charging, immediately after trial, and on automatic appeal. Even governors 
pay more attention to clemency as a safety valve in capital cases than in 
noncapital cases. While the Court has not strictly required each of these 
procedures under the Eighth Amendment, it has viewed most of them as 
critical to capital punishment’s constitutionality.9 The upshot is that, as 
Douglas Berman notes, “whatever one’s perspective . . . on the modern 
administration of capital punishment, the system at least has the benefit of 
subjecting prosecutors’ sentencing judgments . . . to a series of meaningful 
‘second looks.’”10 
Several observations jump out about these cases. First, with the 
exception of limited portions of some of the Apprendi decisions that 
discussed the jury as a check, none is self-consciously about fragmentation. 
Second, their interventions have not been theoretically or doctrinally pure. 
They have moved in fits and starts, and they rest on a grab bag of 
interpretive approaches and constitutional grounds—formalism and 
functionalism, the Sixth Amendment and the Eighth. Third, in part for 
those reasons, scholars do not normally view them together, instead 
lumping distinct lines of cases into their own doctrinal boxes. Finally, 
despite all that, the basic idea of fragmentation inhabits their interstices. 
8 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 488–89 (discussing the “limited utility” of juvenile transfer decisions as a 
check on the excessive punishment of juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (observing, based on 
structural considerations, that “the fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without parole 
possible for some juvenile[s] . . . does not justify a judgment that many States intended to subject 
[them] to [such] sentences”); Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1745, 1780–81 (2012). 
9 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 371–96 (1995) (reviewing 
the constitutional framework for regulation of capital punishment). 
10 Douglas Berman, Keynote Address, Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be 
Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 432 (2010). 
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Together they evince a shared (if imperfectly realized) theme: in 
sentencing, as elsewhere, no single actor should hold all the cards. 
II. PUNISHMENT
That theme has special purchase when it comes to punishment. In that 
context, fragmentation is not only a check against the government. In an 
ideal world, it also acts as an affirmative good, working to ensure that 
punishment not only reflects the eighteenth century’s populism or the 
Warren Court’s representation-reinforcing countermajoritarianism, but also 
filters a broader range of views and considerations that matter to 
stakeholders on criminal justice issues. That is especially appropriate 
because of the indeterminate and perspective-driven nature of punishment 
determinations. 
Substantively, punishment implicates a wide and messy array of 
competing values and objectives. Great disagreement often exists about 
how to weigh and apply the purposes of punishment—deterrence, 
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—generally and in specific 
cases. Even where some common ground exists, punishment must account 
for and pursue things like mercy, equality, fairness, reform, consistency 
across cases, healing, and dignity, among other weighty goals and values. It 
must protect the public while respecting individual defendants and victims. 
And it must simultaneously embrace rules and standards and be forward- 
and backward-looking, as what looks just ex ante in the abstract might look 
unjust ex post in a real, flesh-and-blood case.11 
For these reasons, as Henry Hart put it, punishment demands 
“multivalued rather than . . . single-valued thinking.”12 That is why the 
Supreme Court has steadfastly resisted commitment to any single purpose 
of punishment as a matter of constitutional law.13 Comparative desert, 
informed by evidence of community consensus, provides a backstop for a 
small number of especially severe sentences, mostly capital ones. But 
beyond that, the Constitution leaves room to effectuate a “constantly 
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the 
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical 
views of the nature of man.”14 
11 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 428–29 (2013). 
12 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 401 
(1958). 
13 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
999–1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
14 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
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Procedurally, that adjustment process involves a host of actors, each 
with its own strengths and perspectives on the demands of justice. Some 
are well suited to bringing ex ante, high-level, and more centralized 
viewpoints to bear. Legislatures (at least in theory) are good at ranking 
categories of crime and making decisions about basic trade-offs. 
Sentencing commissions can do much of the same and can gather and 
crunch data, generate information on the costs of sentencing options, and 
establish more detailed guidance for given crimes and sentences. Appellate 
courts can spot trends and differences in treatment of similar types of cases 
that might be lost on frontline sentencers and can further craft rules and 
doctrines to guide line-level players. 
Other actors are better at weighing individualized, granular, and ex 
post considerations. Juries and (when they have discretion) sentencing 
judges are especially good at considering particularistic, human aspects of 
blameworthiness. So too are prosecutors, who apply their equitable 
judgment in deciding which cases to charge, which to drop or divert, and 
what plea deals to strike. Probation and parole officials can evaluate 
offenders’ prospects of and progress toward rehabilitation and reform. And 
governors exercising their clemency and pardon powers can do the same 
and can factor in other case-specific and circumstantial concerns that other 
actors failed or were unable to consider. 
Each of these actors represents stakeholders in different ways. 
Legislatures are broadly representative and aggregate the abstract and 
general preferences of the body politic as a whole. Governors do so too, but 
from a unitary and often more ex post standpoint. Juries are at the opposite 
end of the spectrum: they directly inject the views and lay intuitions of 
ordinary, local citizens into real cases. Elected prosecutors are somewhere 
in between, channeling local community concerns about crime and justice. 
Judges likewise hear and filter local concerns, including those of 
defendants, victims, family members, and local community members. They 
also police punishment for deeper democratic failures by enforcing 
individual constitutional rights. Most state sentencing commissions include 
voices from across criminal justice, such as defense lawyers, prosecutors, 
judges, corrections officials, legislators, and members of the public.15 
Parole boards consider the views of the community, victim, and victim’s 
and offender’s friends and family when making their decisions. And 
probation and parole officers work closely with communities to help ex-
offenders get their lives back on track. 
15 Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173, 174 
(1995). 
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All of this explains why the Constitution does not prescribe particular 
goals of punishment or, except in rare circumstances, interfere with 
particular sentencing outcomes. In our system, just punishment is not, and 
has never been, a matter of a priori philosophical principles. It is a matter 
of democratic processes, of dialogue and deliberation that engages all of 
the considerations that plausibly inform punishment—not only its 
multiplicity of values, but also the different viewpoints, practical needs, 
and interests of stakeholders.16 The Constitution embodies that notion in a 
concrete set of institutional arrangements designed to give content to 
punishment by filtering those variegated inputs through different actors. 
Just punishment, by and large, is what comes out of that process; it is 
defined by the process that produces it. 
This also explains why the fact that fragmented sentencing might lead 
to different sentences across different decisionmakers for similar offenders 
is not, without more, an affront to its constitutionality. Norms of equality 
are fundamental to any democratic system of punishment, and the 
dispersion of outcomes flowing from fragmented and decentralized 
sentencing is a frequent topic of concern. But when it comes to 
punishment, part of the point of fragmentation, especially insofar as its 
localist and community dimensions are concerned, is that different 
stakeholders might weigh the competing goals and values of punishment 
differently.17 So long as they do so through a process that takes care to 
ensure that discrete and powerless groups do not bear a disproportionate 
risk of worse results—so long as, in other words, the process is not infected 
by any democratic failures and does not rest on any constitutionally 
impermissible considerations—the Constitution lets divergent punishments 
fall where they may. As the Court’s jury cases emphasize, that respect for 
normative variation between and among communities is essential to 
punishment’s legitimacy.18 
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In these ways, the Constitution’s approach to sentencing is 
microcosmic of its approach to criminal justice. Fragmentation of criminal 
justice is baked into our constitutional framework, in the basic division of 
16 Variants of this theme appear repeatedly in the Court’s sentencing cases. See, e.g., Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–68 (2010); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 
4–5 (1986). 
17 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 
102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1461–64 (2016). 
18 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
111:1437 (2017) Fragmentation and Democracy 
1445 
power in Articles I, II, and III and in numerous textual provisions. Article 
I’s Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Habeas Corpus Clauses prevent the 
legislature from exercising the judicial power by retrospectively targeting 
individuals for punishment or detention.19 Article II’s pardon power gives 
the executive a hand in punishment, and Article III ensures (through its life 
tenure and salary provisions) that judges can enforce constitutional limits 
through impartial process and, through its guarantee of a jury trial for all 
crimes, that the citizenry can check all three branches.20 The Bill of Rights 
layers on yet more mechanisms for fragmented input, including grand 
juries, public scrutiny of trials, the drawing of jurors from the local 
community, and a reasonableness limitation on searches and seizures—a 
limit that, Akhil Amar and others have argued, incorporated the views of 
local juries as originally applied.21 The Tenth Amendment (and federalism 
generally) makes clear that states, localities, and “the people” have central 
roles to play as well.22 
The diffusing effects of this structure radiate into nearly every 
doctrinal area. To take the Fourth Amendment as an example, local 
executive officials—elected mayors, elected or appointed police chiefs, and 
line-level police officers—build their compliance and implementation 
efforts around local needs and priorities, which might vary based on crime 
rates, community preferences, or policing philosophy. Disaggregated local 
judges give content to and enforce the Amendment’s protections in 
suppression hearings, and local juries periodically weigh in also. We 
typically think of Katz v. United States’ famous “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test as laying down national norms for protected conduct.23 But as 
applied in local courts, it often incorporates and turns on local norms about 
privacy and seclusion as well as duly enacted state and local laws and 
judge-made common law defining property or the like.24 Appellate courts 
review and shape those interpretations and applications, and legislative 
bodies sometimes respond to them by expanding or restricting privacy 
protections in selective areas. And state and local legislative bodies initially 
delimit the conduct that might trigger Fourth Amendment searches and 
seizures by defining the bounds of criminal conduct through state laws and 
municipal codes. As with sentencing, what determines a lawful search and 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2–3; id. § 10, cl. 1. 
20 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1; see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the 
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1013–16 (2006). 
21 U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VI; AMAR, supra note 3, at 70–77, 85–89, 105–06, 112–13. 
22 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
23 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
24 See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834–36, 1867–71 (2016). 
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seizure is the product of many institutions and actors, each with its own 
perspective and each representing stakeholders in its own way. 
The same dynamic flows through criminal justice writ large. As a 
matter of constitutional norms and practices, if not doctrine, criminal 
justice is highly disaggregated. Most criminal justice matters remain 
matters of state and local law. State attorneys general and police might 
investigate and prosecute some subset of especially significant crimes (like 
large-scale frauds or terrorism). But they leave the vast bulk of 
enforcement to localities, which pass and enforce their own codes in 
addition. That enforcement apparatus includes thousands of counties and 
municipalities, several thousand prosecutors’ offices employing tens of 
thousands of prosecutors, and more than twelve thousand police 
departments employing hundreds of thousands of officers. It also includes 
thousands of local courts, judges, jails and prisons, parole and probation 
officers, and everyday citizens who interact (as jurors or otherwise) with 
the system on a daily basis.25 
The benefits of this structure are not only—or even primarily—in 
guarding against governmental abuse. They also rest on broadly democratic 
concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and self-determination. As 
with sentencing, fragmentation provides multiple nodes of input that allow 
communities and neighborhoods to tailor on-the-ground criminal justice to 
their unique needs and reconcile competing values and priorities in their 
own ways—to, in short, give content and meaning to the messy, 
multivalued, and trade-off-laden enterprise that is criminal justice. That is 
why it is not uncommon to see different local prosecutors, police 
departments, and courts and judges taking different enforcement or 
sentencing approaches to the same state- or even citywide laws. It is also 
why many movements that self-consciously seek to make criminal justice 
more responsive to stakeholders—like problem-solving courts, community 
policing and prosecution, and community justice centers—are 
25 See SUZANNE M. STRONG ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012, at 1, 3–4 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWY5-YHW5]; DUREN BANKS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 
1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/N29W-4FDP]; BRIAN A. 
REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: 
PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4TTH-GDVW]; STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1 
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8JT-TCHV]. 
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overwhelmingly seen as taking necessarily decentralized, bottom-up 
approaches to crime and punishment.26 
To be sure, the precise ways in which fragmentation will facilitate 
democracy in criminal justice will vary based on one’s theory of 
democracy—whether it be pluralist, participatory, deliberative, anti-
inegalitarian, or something else.27 But robust avenues for input and 
exchange are central to virtually every one of these theories.28 And 
fragmentation helps—at least ideally—to provide them. 
IV. LIMITS
That is the optimist’s vision. But of course, fragmentation has its 
democratic limits and downsides. Most glaring, the mix of inputs that the 
Constitution assumes will inform punishment in theory often fails to do so 
in fact. 
This happens for a variety of reasons. One problem is politics. In 
almost every institutional arena, the politics of criminal justice is 
notoriously “pathological.”29 Legislative and gubernatorial elections, even 
prosecutorial elections, are blunt instruments for highlighting nuanced 
policy differences and eliciting granular input from voters on specific 
policies. Election rhetoric often turns on high-profile, sensationalist, and 
atypical cases or crimes. While the benefits of appearing smart on crime are 
increasing, the risks of appearing soft on crime are still very substantial. 
Many of the groups most affected by real-world punishment policies—such 
as poor, urban, inner-city communities—have little voice at the ballot box 
and no real lobbying presence, leaving them with no effective say in 
criminal justice policymaking. (Felon disenfranchisement laws mean that 
most prisoners and ex-prisoners literally have no electoral voice.) Well-
organized, well-funded, and usually tough-on-crime special interests—
victims’ groups, prison workers, police unions, the National Rifle 
Association—overwhelm debate and exert a disproportionate influence 
instead. 
Perspectives thus flatten out, with legislators, prosecutors, governors, 
and elected judges often hearing roughly the same thing, and more of it. A 
26 By contrast, some of the worst excesses of criminal justice in recent years—namely, those of 
federal sentencing—occurred in an institutional context in which stakeholder participation and on-the-
ground experimentation were minimal.
27 David Sklansky has elegantly dissected such differences in the context of policing. See generally 
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005).
28 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 20–24 (2012).
29 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 505 
(2001).
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similar problem exists at the retail level, where the voices of powerful 
defendants and their communities—think of corporate and white-collar 
cases—carry disproportionate weight at every point of the process, and the 
voices of marginalized defendants and their communities often get little 
traction. 
Fragmentation also mutes the manifold influences that different actors 
ideally filter and represent. Prosecutors, for instance, ideally carefully 
consider the merits and context of each case and the needs and 
circumstances of the community, victim, and offender before deciding how 
to charge or what sentence to recommend. In reality, though, they often see 
their job as clearing the cases in front of them, giving them professional 
incentives to stack up convictions, boost clearance rates, and layer on plea 
bargaining chips by overcharging. They have few incentives to consider the 
impact of their recommended sentences on the community or even the 
direct costs of those sentences for taxpayers, as prison and jail costs come 
out of other actors’ budgets. Parole boards ideally channel community 
concerns about safety and the virtues of forgiveness, moral reform, and 
rehabilitation. In reality, risk aversion almost always trumps everything 
else, as parole boards never capture the benefits of correct release decisions 
but stand to suffer immediate reprimands for incorrect ones. Sentencing 
judges trying to balance the interests of the victim, defendant, and 
community in punishment might lack information about how exactly a 
sentence of community supervision will be applied or what it will cost, and 
they have no direct incentive to consider cost in any case. Similar 
distortions affect other actors. Diffusion of power, in short, has a blinder 
effect: it both encourages actors to focus only on their narrow job, and 
makes it harder to take account of broader interests even if they want to.30 
A lack of accountability mechanisms exacerbates these problems. It is 
easier for actors to ignore broader interests if they do not need to explain or 
justify their decisions—which, with the partial exception of sentencing 
explanations, most actors in the punishment pipeline do not. It is also easier 
for them to ignore (or uncritically agree with) each other, undercutting the 
dialogic benefits of fragmentation that much of constitutional sentencing 
law presupposes.31 By providing multiple points of influence, 
30 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 13–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2924584 [https://perma.cc/B4XC-4QUY]. 
31 Many observers of federal sentencing law, for instance, complain that the rule allowing federal 
appellate courts to presume that district courts’ within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable encourages 
district courts uncritically to follow the Guidelines and impedes the conversational development of 
sentencing law that United States v. Booker envisioned. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Booker in the 
Circuits: Backlash or Balancing Act?, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 23, 29 (2015).
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fragmentation might even impede accountability and undermine expansive 
representation of interests. Savvy or wealthy players can find and exploit 
the access points that work best for them, such as when prison guard unions 
lobby for tougher sanctions or when corporate executives marshal teams of 
lawyers to work with prosecutors and regulators on deferred prosecution 
agreements that spare them any serious sanction. Dispersed or less visible 
ones might not have the experience or wherewithal to do so, and might find 
it more difficult to demand an accounting of multiple actors than a single 
one for policies and decisions that ignore their views. 
Again, these points generalize. Return to the Fourth Amendment. 
While the perspectives of multiple actors might inform and give content to 
Fourth Amendment law, those perspectives often favor the powerful. The 
Amendment’s incorporation of local laws and customs into reasonable 
expectations of privacy tilts it toward the propertied and moneyed classes 
who can buy privacy through land or the legislative process, as William 
Stuntz has shown.32 Tailoring implementation around dominant local needs 
and priorities can translate to interventions like order-maintenance policing 
that, while sensible to some local community members, are viewed more 
suspiciously by the residents of the neighborhoods at which they are aimed. 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is judged from the standpoint of a 
police officer interacting with a potential perpetrator or a hypothetical 
innocent person. It does not factor in the lived experiences of real flesh-
and-blood targets, often politically disempowered minorities, whose 
responses to police conduct are colored by a long history of police abuse.33 
And while the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test of public need versus 
individual right considers the interests of the defendant immediately before 
the court, it does not consider the interests of defendants as a class, let 
alone the interests of clearly innocent (but still searched) individuals as a 
class, whose cases do not even wend their way into the pipeline.34 The 
Amendment’s transactional focus thus systematically fails to take into 
account the perspectives of, say, inner-city minority youths, who might 
experience a large-scale stop-and-frisk initiative (like New York City’s) as 
a program to police them as a group, or everyday telephone users, who 
might chafe at learning that the National Security Agency is collecting and 
32 William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265, 1265–67 (1999).
33 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 969–70 
(2002).
34 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1968) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test); 
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as 
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1051–56 (2016) (observing that Fourth 
Amendment balancing considers only the interests of the individual being searched).
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1450 
searching metadata from their calls (as it did under the USA PATRIOT 
Act). But while the telephone users might be able to press their concerns 
effectively in the political process, the inner-city youths cannot. 
As in sentencing, the fragmentation of power can encourage tunnel 
vision. Police, for instance, have little incentive to consider what their 
arrest decisions will do to prosecutors’ caseloads, prosecutors have little 
incentive to consider what their bail recommendations will do to local jail 
populations, and neither have much incentive to consider how their actions 
will affect the defendant’s job, family members, or neighborhood, let alone 
the public fisc. Part of the problem is doctrinal: those wider considerations 
are not baked into the constitutional or statutory criteria governing arrest or 
bail. But a big part of it is a psychological consequence of fragmentation: 
when the administration of criminal justice is split up between many 
players, each with her own bailiwick, focus naturally narrows. Even where 
actors could think and act more broadly, the siloed decisionmaking of 
fragmentation might become an excuse, allowing them to disclaim a 
particular injustice or pathology as not their fault. 
The same accountability and related concerns discussed above follow. 
Who is accountable when no one actor in the criminal justice pipeline 
clearly has the responsibility to consider and give effect to a range of 
interests and points of view, let alone explain why she is doing so?35 Well-
organized and well-resourced groups can use this structure to their 
advantage, but the loosely organized and poorly resourced groups who so 
often are in the trenches of criminal justice cannot. For them, it is a barrier, 
not a boon.36 
V. REFORMS
We are left with a dilemma: the same structure that potentially 
generates valuable democratic benefits for punishment in terms of voice 
and perspective also falls prey and even contributes to serious democratic 
deficits. What to do? 
Answering that question would be difficult in a lifetime’s work, and I 
certainly cannot do it in a few paragraphs. But despite its drawbacks, we 
cannot and should not abandon the Constitution’s fragmented approach to 
35 Contrast this with the unitary structure of agency regulatory authority in many areas of 
administrative law, in which all interests and points of view filter through a single, centralized agency 
that makes substantive rules and controls retail enforcement and sanctioning, and must rigorously 
explain and defend its decisions.
36 For two excellent treatments of this effect, one dealing with policing and one dealing with 
criminal justice policymaking, see LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND 
THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2008), and Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real 
Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2015).
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crime and punishment. We cannot easily centralize everything at the 
federal or state level, nor can we easily eliminate the separate spheres of 
authority that actors in the system inhabit (though legislatures sometimes 
try). Even if we could, such changes would lead to more worrisome 
problems, such as criminal justice cut off from local conditions and even 
more beholden to powerful interests than it is now. The more promising 
move is to look for ways to make different loci of influence and 
representation more meaningful within our existing framework—to do 
more to ensure that multiple voices are heard. 
Constitutional law can help, to a degree. Like the Warren Court, 
courts interpreting individual rights provisions could do more to reinforce 
perspectives that are often excluded from the process. For a sampling of 
possibilities, courts applying the Fourth Amendment could fold the 
outlooks of victims of police abuse, innocent civilians, and communities of 
color into their reasonableness analysis. They could look beyond the 
interests of individual defendants to accept aggregate data as evidence of 
the existence or gravity of group-based targeting and other harms from 
repeated searches, as Judge Shira Scheindlin did in the high-profile 
challenge to New York City’s stop-and-frisk program.37 The law of Batson 
v. Kentucky could be liberalized to make it easier to challenge juries that
have been skewed along racial or gender lines, making them more
representative of the community.38 Juries could be allowed to know the
penal consequences of their verdicts (which, outside of jury sentencing,
current law ordinarily prohibits), expanding the factors they consider in
their deliberations. More generally, the Equal Protection Clause could be
given real teeth as a tool of judicial oversight with respect to police
conduct, prosecutorial charging, and sentencing. Collateral consequences
that impair voice, like felon disenfranchisement and prohibitions from
serving on juries, could be held to more rigorous constitutional standards
and struck down unless they directly relate to the crime of conviction.
Constitutional law also could force actors to listen more and take 
accountability seriously. Graham’s requirement that parole boards give 
juvenile offenders a “meaningful” opportunity for release could itself be 
made meaningful by requiring parole boards to robustly explain and justify 
their decisions;39 that would better force them to confront the defendant’s, 
37 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
38 474 U.S. 79 (1986); see Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury 
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 161–65 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of proving 
unconstitutional reliance on race or gender in jury selection under Batson).
39 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
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victim’s, and community’s interests and to grapple with the forward-
looking considerations that in theory they should take into account. One 
might even apply some similar, if more deferential, reason-giving 
requirement to prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions in some 
subset of serious cases as a matter of due process, which could serve to 
enhance feedback and responsiveness from and to the community. 
Constitutional doctrine could better protect less institutionalized forms 
of input into police, prosecutorial, and judicial decisions as well, like cop 
watching (through the First Amendment) and the public’s right to observe 
bail hearings, plea colloquies, trials, and sentencings (through the First and 
Sixth Amendments). Jocelyn Simonson and others have thoughtfully 
shown how this more oppositional approach to participation is an important 
source of perspectives that otherwise go unheeded.40 
Greater attention to the values (but not the doctrine) of federalism and 
its close cousin localism could likewise help. Pushing more criminal justice 
power—legislative, enforcement, adjudicative, and penal—down to 
directly affected communities and neighborhoods could enhance 
representativeness and sharpen lines of authority. City councils could be 
given real power to craft their own substantive criminal codes in response 
to community concerns—such as stricter gun control laws or more humane 
punishments for locally focused crimes—even if far-flung state legislators 
disagree. Prosecutorial districts could be drawn more narrowly to minimize 
the disconnect between who elects prosecutors (often suburban voters) and 
whom they prosecute (often residents of inner-city communities); judicial 
districts could be similarly tailored. Prosecutorial and police offices could 
adopt genuine community policing and prosecution structures that create 
regular and responsive interaction with stakeholders. In reviewing local 
laws, policies, and police and prosecutorial actions, judges might consider 
the degree to which they reflect community or neighborhood preferences 
based on inclusive, responsive, and autonomous processes, deferring more 
to those that do.41 Local prosecutors even could be given their own 
corrections budgets, which would counteract tunnel vision by widening 
their perspective on the impact of their interventions and prompting them to 
40 See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 441–43 (2016); Jocelyn 
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2197–205, 
2227–32 (2014).
41 Cf. Brief for The Chicago Neighborhood Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 5, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121), 1998 WL 328366, at *5 (defending 
Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance on the ground that it resulted from the efforts of the inner city, 
high-crime neighborhoods in which it was implemented and that those communities should have special 
autonomy to adopt norms that are responsive to local conditions).
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work more closely with other actors in the pipeline—police, judges, parole 
boards, even community members—to marshal scarce resources.42 
Other statutory and administrative reforms could encourage more 
circumspect thinking in various ways. Subjecting wholesale police, 
prosecutorial, and sentencing policies to some variant of a notice-and-
comment process could give more traction to a wider spectrum of 
stakeholders and yield more balanced interest representation on those 
policies than currently exists. Rewarding parole boards for successful 
release decisions or giving them release quotas could prompt them to 
consider points of view and interests that they otherwise ignore. Baking 
wider consideration of costs into statutory criteria for everything from bail 
to sentencing could do something similar, as costs act as a stand-in for 
typically ignored viewpoints, forcing decisionmakers to reflect on trade-
offs—the impact of pretrial detention on defendants’ jobs or families, the 
community resources consumed by holding them instead of sending them 
out with ankle bracelets, and so forth—that they might otherwise shunt 
aside.43 
These examples are just a start. Some of them would require 
substantial innovation in constitutional doctrine or otherwise, and the 
political pathologies mentioned earlier would make some difficult to get off 
the ground.44 Others would be more straightforward. All would do more to 
capture the benefits of fragmentation—the value in matters of criminal 
justice that comes from considering the perspectives of diverse 
stakeholders—than what we currently have. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution’s rough-and-tumble fragmentation of criminal justice 
does not just constrain the state’s power to punish. Ideally, it channels and 
guides it, creating pathways for different inputs in an area in which matters 
42 Ronald Wright discusses some of these and similar reforms in Ronald F. Wright, Reinventing 
American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21–24, 28–29) 
(on file with author).
43 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 
1277, 1309, 1314 (2005).
44 Where political obstacles exist, courts and other actors (such as independent commissions) 
sometimes can aid in overcoming them by catalyzing and providing political cover for reforms. 
California’s Realignment, which substantially localized the responsibility for sentencing large numbers 
of low-level offenders, is a good example. Realignment was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s 
Brown v. Plata decision ordering California to reduce its state prison population to 137.5% of design 
capacity to relieve extreme overcrowding that led to violations of the Eighth Amendment. 563 U.S. 493, 
538–45 (2011); see Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal 
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 327 (2014) (describing the legislative response to 
Plata).
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of perspective are of special concern. The daunting challenge is to make 
sure that we capture this scheme’s benefits—that the different nodes in the 
system give effect to diverse viewpoints representing all stakeholders’ 
interests. Only by doing so can we realize the “cool and deliberate sense of 
the community”45 that the Constitution aims to foster in matters of 
punishment. 
45 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 327 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001); see also id. NOS. 10, 51.
